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Professor Arthur S. Miller, a master of the genre of creative con-
stitutionalism, contributes an impressive example in his article, Nuclear
Weapons and Constitutional Law. He advances several provocative ar-
guments for possible constitutional limits on United States participa-
tion in the nuclear arms race; these arguments, undoubtedly, will stim-
ulate much thought and development-unless a nuclear catastrophe
intervenes.
Miller identifies a particular kind of complacency or cynicism
among lawyers that allows many of us to assume that nuclear weapons
simply are more powerful ways to kill people. It is surely important to
challenge this assumption. On a more basic level, the threat of nuclear
disaster invites all citizens-not merely lawyers and judges-to con-
sider and to construe the text and meaning of the United States
Constitution.
Law unquestionably serves as a secular religion in our democracy1
and de Tocqueville's recognition that important political issues tend to
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1. See generally C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY
170-88 (1969); M. LERNER, AMERICA AS A CIVILIZATION 442-43 (1957); Corwin, The
Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol, 30 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1071 (1936); T.
ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 59-71 (1935) and Llewellyn, The Constitu-
tion as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934). Of course, much of Arthur S.
Miller's impressive output is also directly on point.
As a young man, Abraham Lincoln urged other young men of Springfield, Illinois
to let reverence for law "become the political religion of the nation. . . ." R. HOF-
STADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 103 (1948). Alexis de Tocqueville,
writing at the same time, but with a bit less reverence, called law in England and
America "an occult science." A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 287 (P.
Bradley ed. 1945).
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end up in court is even more accurate today.' Our survival and that of
our constitutional faith may depend on our willingness to consider the
nexus between constitutional values and protecting our posterity.
In the past, slavery, civil rights and, more recently, abortion were
the kinds of issues important enough to provoke many people to supple-
ment the views of lawyers with their own constitutional judgments. To
the horror of many of those learned in the law, precedential baggage
has sometimes been jettisoned in the process. In trying times, judges
and their colleagues sometimes behave more like strict constrictionists
than strict constructionists.
Realistically, of course, no one today should entertain the notion
that a legal challenge to the United States' role in the spread of nu-
clear weapons is likely to produce an enthusiastic response from the
United States Supreme Court. Yet the threat of nuclear conflagration
might be just the type of issue to move citizens to seek connections
between constitutional language and contemporary values.
Just as it would be a mistake to leave constitutional values entirely
to those with legal training, it would also be unwise to ignore the rele-
vance of constitutional language and structure to such a debate.
Plainly, as Chief Justice Taney's Dred Scott decision tragically demon-
strated,3 there are difficulties and dangers in constitutionalizing debate
over public issues. But if the Constitution is relevant to such a debate,
attention must be paid.
Miller's article suggests two different kinds of expansive interpre-
tation of constitutional language. The first, more formal type concerns
his arguments for the binding nature of international law and for the
possible invocation of the non-delegation doctrine, which constitution-
ally limits the extent to which a branch of government may delegate its
powers. Both these lines of analysis involve important legal arguments
about the separation of powers in our national government. Miller is a
2. A. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 290. See also id. at 102-09. For an intro-
duction to the voluminous recent literature on the litigiousness of Americans, and our
propensity to resort to courtroom battles and judicial orders to resolve all manner of
disputes, see J. LIBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981); Manning, Hyperlexis: Our
National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 767 (1977).
3. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). For a general discus-
sion of this case, its context and its consequences, see D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED
SCOTT CASE (1978).
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leading constitutional law expert on this topic; his thoughts on the sub-
ject are surely worthy of consideration. I leave it to others to debate
how convincing Miller's specific arguments are.
What interests me more is Miller's second category of argument.
Here he suggests that the phrase in the Preamble to the United States
Constitution that concerns securing "the Blessing of Liberty to our-
selves and our Posterity" may be a meaningful-perhaps even a legally
enforceable - concept.
That the Preamble expresses a common theme is underscored
when one considers the context in which early state constitutions as
well as the federal document were composed and ratified. Those who
precipitated a Revolutionary War and established a nation on an inno-
vative constitutional scaffolding inteided federal and state governments
to provide for and protect not only themselves, but the generations to
follow. The influential Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, for ex-
ample, began with the following brave proclamation about equality and
the rights of men:
1. That all men are by nature equally free and independent and
have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state
of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their
posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means
of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety.4
A Republican government was formed to secure the happiness and
safety of the founders and of their posterity. As Thomas Jefferson ar-
gued, the living hold the earth in usufruct for future generations.5 Each
4. 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 49 (W.
Swindler ed. 1979) (emphasis added). Virginia retains this language as Article I of her
Bill of Rights.
5. Jefferson's assertion "that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living" appears
in his letter to James Madison, written September 6, 1789 but not mailed until January
9, 1790. That letter, and the exchange it provoked between Madison and Jefferson, is
discussed in illuminating fashion in A. KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON 62-96 (1950).
See also D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 179, 291 (1951). Jefferson
was sufficiently serious about the obligations of those living to those to follow that he
proposed specific legal contraints to guard against waste and other violations of the
natural law duty he believed to be owed by the present generation.
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1 42 Nova Law Journal 7:1982
generation is morally bound to preserve the inheritance of those to fol-
low. This concept of a responsibility to preserve the earth for the future
was a central tenet in the consciousness and the constitution-making of
the period. It does not take too much stretching across the intervening
two hundred years to see how the early hope and effort of the founders
to preserve and protect their political experiment for posterity is rele-
vant to the threat of nuclear catastrophe today. Provoked in a positive
sense by Miller's analysis, I now turn to an exploration of that idea,
which I will call constitutional protection of posterity. My discussion is
divided into three categories: Preamble, Protection, and Posterity.
Preamble
What legal weight should be accorded the Preamble to the Consti-
tution? This question has seldom been explored in American constitu-
tional law.' Like motherhood, the flag, and the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the Preamble is honored more by invocation than by observance.
The language of the Preamble is generally relegated to misty patriotic
incantations - appropriate for introductions at political gatherings and
the socialization of immigrants, schoolchildren and the like, but not for
the hardheaded business of those trained in the law. But when debate
about constitutional text becomes particularly heated and spills out into
the streets, as it did in the context of antislavery agitation prior to the
Civil War, for example, citizens-in-the-street often begin to proclaim in
plain language their understanding of the Preamble.7 Indeed, this ten-
dency helps to explain why the Preamble figures so infrequently in the
constitutional discourse of judges, lawyers and legal scholars. If the
public may parse the Preamble, it begins to appear hopelessly and dan-
gerously open-ended.
The clear possibility of imminent nuclear danger is the appropriate
occasion for reconsideration of what constitutional weight the Preamble
should bear. A full exploration of the issue must await more time and
6. A suggestive recent exception appears in Black, A Round Trip to Eire: Two
Books on the Irish Constitution, Book Review, 91 YALE L.J. 391 (1981) Black's argu-
ment concerning application of the Ninth Amendment clearly relates to, and rein-
forces, the themes sketched in this essay.
7. See, e.g., W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977) and my review at 56 TEx. L. REV. 1319 (1978).
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space; however, Miller makes a significant start. Yet Miller may have
dismissed the legal importance of the Preamble a bit too quickly; he
also seems not to have weighed adequately the possibility of internally
inconsistent commands within the Preamble itself. Miller points to the
textual provision about securing the blessings of liberty not merely for
ourselves, but also for our posterity. He then quickly moves to a discus-
sion of the concept of natural justice. Thus Miller does not wrestle with
other language in the Preamble that commits our government "to pro-
vide for the common defence" and to "insure domestic Tranquility."
Those who would expand or maintain our nuclear arsenal could cer-
tainly argue that the task they have set for themselves is to carry out
those directives.
The possibility that both sides might invoke the Preamble in a con-
stitutional argument about nuclear weapons does not make it irrele-
vant. Internal contradition in the constitutional text is neither as silly
nor as strange as it might first appear. Indeed, the phenomenon of con-
flicting claims, all premised on constitutional language, is a frequent,
even prevalent mode of constitutional law argument. The possibility
that the Constitution itself contains inconsistent commands and con-
flicting rights and obligations is an idea not yet adequately explored. 8 A
reading of our constitutional history compels recognition of just such
problematic interpretations. It also forces those would construe the
Constitution's language to consider the structure as well as the words
of the document.
In many ways, the Preamble is the obvious place to begin. Its clear
indication of transgenerational concern should not be ignored. At a
minimum, the Preamble suggests that constitutional meaning should be
derived with an eye to the future as well as to the past. Brief considera-
tion of both the specific language and the structure of the Constitution,
as they pertain to the obligation of government to protect the populace,
illustrates my point that the Preamble suggests the Constitution should
be discussed as if posterity were eavesdropping.
8. For useful initial forays, see generally Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Con-
stitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1022 (1978) and C. MILLER, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969).
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Protection
Miller provides a summary of a few recent and controversial deci-
sions by the United States Supreme Court which, taken together, sug-
gest an ill-defined constitutional right to privacy and autonomy. Such a
constitutional right, now generally conceded to be a right derived from
a revised or revisited idea of substantive due process,9 could conceiva-
bly be extended dramatically to encompass the family of man.
Such a concept of family exceeds the grand old American nuclear
family and even the extended family, whose vital role in the American
past was essential to the Court's decision in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland.10 It is too grandiose a gambit, however, to leap from the
Court's groping efforts to define some right to intimate associations", to
a claim of constitutional contraints that may be invoked to promote
group survival.
This jump is troublesome for several reasons. First, most of the
Court's recent decisions are premised on a highly individualistic notion
of procreative and familial roles. Additionally, the "bad press" that
protection of intimate relationships received from the public as well as
from constitutional experts soon after its discovery by the Supreme
Court makes this particular constitutional claim a somewhat shaky
platform upon which to construct an edifice for constitutional
protections.
Finally, it is somewhat anomalous to premise an argument advo-
cating constitutional concern for future generations on decisions that
are particularly troublesome precisely because, in invalidating state
barriers to abortions, the Supreme Court appeared to ignore the future-
oriented claim that could be made on behalf of fetuses. This claim im-
plies that the fetus, more than the pregnant woman, is a direct link to
future generations; it alleges that the state, as surrogate for and protec-
tor of the fetus, best represents posterity.
Needless to say, the nexus between the fetus and the future has
9. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502-04 (1977); Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
10. 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977).
11. The most thoughtful effort, generally to accept and to develop the implica-
tions of the new privacy may be found in Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association,
89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
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not been a central element of the debate swirling around abortion. But
such a connection might be a way to rethink, perhaps even to begin to
justify, some of the curious judicial line-drawing in the abortion deci-
sions, even as it suggests new difficulties in Roe v. Wade12 and its mis-
named "progeny."
The "privileges or immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, though not mentioned by Miller, is perhaps more promising, in
part, because the meaning of that clause has scarcely ever been ex-
plored. The United States Supreme Court vitiated any discernible orig-
inal intent behind its words in the Slaughter-House Cases,13 which
narrowed this protection of the rights of citizens to redundancy and
oblivion. But the reasons for disuse of the privileges or immunities
clause since that 1873 decision go beyond the burden of distinguishing,
overruling or ignoring the Court's dubious initial interpretation. They
include the apparent limitation of the phrase to the protection of "citi-
zens" and not - as with other fourteenth amendment protections -
protection of" all persons. Existing judicial constructions of the seem-
ingly parallel privileges and immunities provision in Article IV of the
United States Constitution also complicate new interpretations of the
fourteenth amendment language. In recent years, however, a surprising
number of constitutional scholars of divergent ideologies have sug-
gested that the hour for privileges or immunities protection has come
round at last.1 4
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
14. See, e.g., Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: 'Its Hour Come
Round at Last,' 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405; J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 22-30,
98 (1980). It may be worth noting that Professor Kurland's literary reference is to
William Butler Yeats's poem, The Second Coming, in which Yeats appears not entirely
sanguine about that vision. In fact, the poem may be read as somewhat prophetic on
the subject of nuclear annihilation. Perhaps Yeats suggests something emerging from
the apocalypse, but he writes of a time when
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
W.B. YEATS, The Second Coming, THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 184 (De-
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Although the idea that all citizens should share in the constitu-
tional privileges or immunities enjoyed by each citizen is provocative in
itself, it is even more so when future citizens are included in the consti-
tutional equation. Yet the Fourteenth Amendment privileges or immu-
nities clause was derived most immediately from the 1866 Civil Rights
Act. It is relatively clear that the men of the 39th Congress sought to
mandate government protection from grievous harms and to guarantee
rights they deemed essential to security.15 The notion that privileges or
immunities has something to do with freedom to choose the means of
individual survival, as well as the assurance of minimal personal and
group security, merits further attention.
Even more promising, I believe, is the argument that the constitu-
tional text and structure combine to impose a duty on government to
guarantee a certain threshold of security to all citizens. This interpreta-
tion, while connected to what I suggested about the Preamble, relies
primarily upon the package of constitutional amendments ratified in
the wake of the Civil War. Elsewhere, I have sought to demonstrate
that the framers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments intended to alter existing notions of federalism and to guarantee
a range of basic individual rights.1 They sought to narrow or to elimi-
nate the gap - starkly illustrated for most of them by constitutional
protection of slavery - between what they deemed to .be natural rights
not previously protected, and what the federal Constitution now should
and could protect.
Those who wrote, passed, and ratified this second Constitution
finitive ed. 1956). A "rough beast," with "gaze blank and pitiless as the sun," now
"Slouches toward Bethelehem to be born." After "twenty centuries of stony sleep...
vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle," it is this rough beast's hour which is now
"come round at last." Id.
15. For an elaboration of this theme, and its historical context, see Soifer, Pro-
tecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 651
(1979); see also Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimi-
nation Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist
Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REv. 462 (1982). Raoul Berger's rather vehement response to
my article is in, Soifer to the Rescue of History, 32 S.C.L. REv. 427 (1981). For
another recent statement of a viewpoint opposed to my own, see dictum concerning the
negative Constitution in Bowers v. DeVito, 51 U.S.L.W. 2163 (7th Cir. Aug. 20, 1982)
(Posner, J.).
16. Soifer, supra note 15, at 686-96, 700-06.
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hoped that state governments would adequately protect the civil and
political rights the federal Constitution now established. By constitu-
tional amendment and by statute, they attempted to assure federal pro-
tection in the event that the states failed in their duty to guarantee
these newly-recognized rights. To those who sought to constitutionalize
the outcome of the Civil War, it was clear that allegiance to govern-
ment compelled a reciprocal governmental duty to protect basic rights.
As they articulated the promise of the second Constitution, they repeat-
edly included the safety and security of all inhabitants. If the states
failed in their obligation to protect those within their borders, it was
the federal government's duty to intervene to secure the basic rights of
all.
Too frequently, the lawyer's stock-in-trade is a tendency to focus
on a single word or phrase to construe a constitutional text. This tech-
nique often misses the central message of the constitutional medium.
Charles Black made this point convincingly years ago, and it has been
developed by several others since." A single example, derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment, will illustrate.
In recent years, and for very good reasons, we have devoted pri-
mary attention to the "equal" part of "equal protection." Many strug-
gled valiantly, and struggle still, to determine when racial stereotypes
and their ilk should be constitutionally forbidden. In this process, the
"protection" element of the constitutional text often is ignored. A few
scholars have begun to develop the theme of constitutional protection
for rights or processes they regard as fundamental, such as the right to
political participation and minimal social welfare.18 Thus far, however,
equality remains the dominant motif, and protection is seldom identi-
fied as an overarching problem.
I do not mean to suggest that protection is a self-explanatory term,
nor that an inquiry about the concept will yield easy answers. Else-
where I have begun to consider the two-edged nature of arguments
about governmental duty to protect. The concept includes both the pos-
17. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1969); Ely, supra note 9, at 73-104; Monaghan, Of 'Liberty' and 'Property,' 62 COR-
NELL L. REV. 405 (1977).
18. See Ely, supra note 9 (equality in the political process); Michelman, On Pro-
tecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969)
(threshold of necessities).
47 1
I 48 i Nova Law Journal 7:1982 1
sibility of paternalism, in a pejorative sense, and of parentalism, a more
positive counterpart.19 It can be demonstrated, I believe, that those who
wrote and adopted both the initial Constitution and the constitutional
innovations after the Civil War operated in contexts that encouraged
them to envision something of each kind of protection, without distin-
guishing clearly between the two.
A right to basic protection can be turned on its head, of course, by
those who assert that foreign domination constitutes the vital threat to
American security. Even this claim does not easily or convincingly ex-
tend to a defense of nuclear weapons proliferation, however. The asser-
tion that in protecting something, we must set in motion the means to
destroy it, is familiar enough after Vietnam. By now, such familiarity
should breed contempt, not nuclear arms.
My claim is that the threat of nuclear annihilation-like a board
bashed across the muzzle of a mule-should be sufficient to get our
attention. We may then begin to consider exactly what kinds of obliga-
tion to the population we consider essential to the constitutive core of
our republican form of government. We will have to confront the vex-
ing issue of how to include posterity in our own generation's
calculations.
Posterity
To begin to grapple with the issue of how to deal with our issue,
we must wrestle anew with a perplexing philosophic and practical prob-
lem, and with a dilemma that deeply concerned eminent American
thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Even to define
posterity is a challenge, as Jefferson discovered when he set out to cal-
culate the lifespan of a generation. He tried to use his generational
concept to create a legal system to assure that the earth would belong
to the living and their posterity, rather than be ruled by the dead hand
of the past. Precision about generations was and remains terribly elu-
sive, however. Therefore, Jefferson's more pragmatic friend, James
Madison, argued that "the present generation is inorally bound to re-
spect the natural rights - the basic needs - of coming generations,
however much positive laws in any given society may depart from the
19. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1981, at B10, col. 6.
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moral ideal."20
Concern for future generations was an integral part of constitu-
tion-making in the nation's formative years. Koch summarized her dis-
cussion of the exchange between Jefferson and Madison as follows: "In
general, the fundamental features of the theory that proved acceptable
to both Jefferson and Madison were forward-looking and generous in
their regard for the liberty and welfare of generations to come in
America. '"21
The difficulty of determining exactly what this concern entails re-
mains with us. Neither rights theorists nor utilitarians have met the
challenge yet. The nearly total absence of posterity in the calculus done
within the school of law and economics is one of the most striking limi-
tations of this new orthodoxy.22 The challenge of somehow acknowledg-
ing and providing for the future is vital, however, and starkly presented
through intensified awareness of nuclear terror.
.Most judicial analysis employs present presumptions and fact-find-
ing to determine something concrete about the past and to serve a re-
medial or punitive end. But in constitutional law, the perspective is
more often both forward and backward looking. One can lose all sense
of balance, of course, in such Janus-like contortions. Yet even self-pro-
claimed strict constructionists usually acknowledge that the Constitu-
tion is a document designed for the future, meant to create a structure
for an ongoing Great Experiment. As Chief Justice John Marshall put
it, the Constitution was "intended to endure for ages to come."'23
Failure to heed this future-oriented aspect of American constitu-
tionalism is commonplace. It is particularly glaring, for example, in the
20. Koch, supra note 5, at 74.
21. Id.
22. For philosophic discussions about possible claims upon contemporaries by
those to follow, see, e.g., OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (R. Sikora and B.
Barry eds. 1978); Kavka, The Paradox of Future Individuals, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
93 (1981) and Parfit, Future Generations: Future Problems, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
113; B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
The best critical discussion I know about the generational problem in the context
of the law and economics debate is found in Heller, The Importance of Narrative Deci-
sion-Making: The Limitations of Legal Economics as a Basis for a Liberal Jurispru-
dence-As Illustrated by the Regulation of Vacation Home Development, 1976 WIs.
L. REV. 385, 459-68.
23. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
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recent efforts by the Supreme Court to make proof of past discrimina-
tory racial motivation a necessary precondition before courts may rec-
ognize violations of rights guaranteed by the Civil War Amendments.
This generally serves, as a practical matter, to constitutionalize the sta-
tus quo.2 4 It appears to reject the vital combination of symbolic and
pragmatic roles the Court often played in the past.
Virtually anything that exists is said to be legitimate under this
approach. Existence is viewed as a race of life, which the Court deems
to be a fair contest. The nuclear arms race may be perceived in much
the same way. Legal protection can be invoked only upon a clear show-
ing of overt, official and effective mistreatment. Victimization alone,
even racial victimization, is not sufficient. Exceptions will be made only
for those who can actually prove bad motive.
Since the central defense of the expansion of nuclear arms is de-
fense - not only a proper motive, but even an admirable one - an
actual constitutional claim that nuclear proliferation endangers rather
than enhances the security of ourselves and our posterity appears
doomed. If it ever got that far, the current Court would easily dismiss
the argument as simply a matter of the claimants' perception of the
problem.25
Such a response-the idea that any actual harm is simply a matter
of one's own subjective perception - is a paraphrase of the way the
Court answered the argument in Plessy v. Ferguson26 that to require
segregated streetcars was a denial of constitutional rights. Like racial
stigma, the danger of nuclear conflagration can be passed over as some-
24. For an initial stab at this theme, see Soifer, Complacency and Constitutional
Law, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 383 (1981). See also Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimina-
tion Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine,
62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978).
25. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
26. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). A disturbing echo of the reasoning in Plessy may be
found in City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981), reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 955
(1981). Here, too, the United States Supreme Court seemed to believe that any stigma
associated with blocking off a street where it traversed a black neighborhood, as it ran
from a prosperous white neighborhood to a public park, was to be found only in the
perception of the black plaintiffs. After all, Justice Stevens argued, the blacks who
complained did not show that blacks ever sought to have streets blocked, only to be
refused. Any disparate impact "could not, in any event, be fairly characterized as a
badge or incident of slavery." Id. at 126.
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thing merely in the eyes of the beholder. This is particularly true today,
when the Social Darwiniah notion of independent individuals freely
choosing their own fate again dominates judicial interpretation of con-
stitutional law. Only if we begin to explore and to heed the constitu-
tional directive to protect our posterity, and begin to include future
generations in our own constitutional calibrations, can we hope to make
certain that the dreaded dead hand of the past does not clasp a future
universe full of dead hands.
Exactly where greater recognition of the claims of posterity would
lead constitutional law is unclear. It is uncommonly important, though,
to consider the organic, direct connection of our founders to subsequent
constitutionalists - including ourselves. In turn, we are inevitably the
parents and preservers of our posterity. This continuity, and the goal of
protecting posterity established in the constitutional framework, sug-
gest that it is neither far-fetched nor unproductive to explore how con-
stitutional values are relevant to the contemporary threat of immediate
nuclear annihilation.
Conclusion
The practical visionaries of the past surely could not have antici-
pated our modern folly. Yet themes of optimistic anticipation and con-
cern for future generations echo through the constitutional scheme they
established. The words of 1787 and 1868 provide no crisp, clean an-
swers to any cases and controversies that might be framed to challenge
the spread of nuclear weapons. But they do bequeath a still, small call
to reason and to hope - for ourselves and for our posterity.
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